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Abstract
Distributed online social networks (DOSNs) were first proposed to solve the problem of privacy,
security and scalability. A significant amount of research was undertaken to offer viable DOSN
solutions that were capable of competing with the existing centralized OSN applications such
as Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram. This research led to the emergence of the use of peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks as a possible solution, upon which several OSNs such as LifeSocial.KOM,
Safebook, PeerSoN among others were based. In this paper, we define the basic requirements
for an P2P OSN. We then revisit one of the first P2P-based OSNs, LifeSocial.KOM, that is now
called LibreSocial, which evolved in the past years to address the challenges of running a com-
pletely decentralized social network. Over the course of time, several essential new technologies
have been incorporatedwithin LibreSocial for better functionalities. In this paperwe describe the
architecture and each individual component of LibreSocial and point out how LibreSocial meets
the basic requirements for a fully functional distributedOSN.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The analysis of online social network (OSN) trends over a period of
more than a decade has shown significant growth in their popularity
among users, and consequently the number of OSNs has risen signifi-
cantly 1,2. This growth in the users and the OSNs is directly attributable
to advances in computing technologies (both hardware and software),
and increased computer know-how among the users. Current popular
OSNs rely heavily on the centralized computing model, in which the
OSN service provider is in charge of handling and presenting the data
of the users, and actually owns all the data. Besides the more obvious
technical risks in the centralized computing model for OSNs which the
providers have endeavored to address, such as unbalanced load distri-
bution, performance bottlenecks, single point of failure, single point of
attackandchannel bottleneck 3, we see twoother concerns that central-
ized OSNs have not addressed well: accumulated costs which manifest
as scalability concerns 4,5 and security and privacy concerns 4,6.
The first concern, accumulated costs due to scalability, are introduced
because of a large number of highly connected users, need for more
infrastructure due to a large network, high network traffic, need for
mechanisms for management and dissemination of the user-generated
content and challenges associated with database scalability 5. To cover
the rising costs, service providers tend to monetize the users’ content
and private data, by selling it to third parties. The second concern, secu-
rity and privacy, are divided into three categories, that is, user-related,
service provider-related, and third-party application related threats 4,6.
User-related threats are a consequence of disclosure of private data to
other users intentionally, such as by hacking, or unintentional due to
lack of or poorly configured privacy settings. service provider-related
threats are mostly due to the fact that the service provider has con-
trol of users’ data. While the user must trust the provider to treat his
data properly, the provider can leak the user’s personal data outside
the context of its initial definition 7,8 and can further allow information
linkages by unauthorized third parties who aggregate data from differ-
ent social data centers to obtain more information about the different
users 9, such as in the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal 1.
1https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c81zyn0888lt/facebook-
cambridge-analytica-data-scandal
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Third-party application related threats are introduced by users to pro-
vide extra functionalities that are not in theOSN, and inmost cases they
are untrusted. For users to use them, they must allow the application to
access their private data which then exposes them and in many cases
there is no component that screens how the applicationmanipulates the
user’s data 10.
Based on these concerns, researchers have proposed the use of
decentralized or distributed computing models hence the emergence
of distributed online social networks. A distributed online social network
(DOSN) is described as “an online social network implemented on a
distributed information management platform, such as a network of
trusted servers or a peer-to-peer (P2P) system or opportunistic net-
work” 11,12. It is distributed in the sense that all computing, storage and
communication resources are provided by the user rather than an eco-
nomically driven provider. I This allows shifting of the implementation
of the infrastructure, and the privacy and security control to the users,
while allowing users to undertake innovative development of the sys-
tem, effectively lowering the operational costs 13. DOSNs can be real-
izedvia twomodesof implementations,web-basedandpeer-to-peer (P2P)
DOSNs 14. Web-based DOSNs are also sometimes collectively called
hybrid OSNs. They are heavily reliant on distributed, federated web
servers usually referred to as pods, that are often operated by private
individuals. Operating a pod requires in-depth technical skills, which
eventually limits the features as well as concentrates the data at a few
pods run by capable users. Inexperienced users can join existing pods.
This renders users vulnerable to privacy concerns as the pod opera-
tors can still access private data on their pods. Similarly to centralized
solutions, the majority of users have to trust someone to maintain the
privacy of their data, a trust that is often misused. The P2P DOSN (or
P2POSNs) on the other hand operate through the sole interconnection
of P2P software run on user devices, similar to previous P2P file sharing
networks, requiring no trust in any operator but require more complex
networking and system solutions. With the right combination of P2P
mechanisms, such aspresented in this paper, a fully distributed, scalable,
reliable and secureOSNplatform can be created that purely runs on the
“free” computing, storage and networking resources of the user devices.
By this, the P2P DOSN does not require the invest of money and thus is
free of the need tomonetize its service.
Peer-to-peer networks are a class of distributed networks in which
the peers act simultaneously as servers and clients, that is providing
and consuming resources to/from each other, in a self-organizing man-
ner without centralized control. The features of P2P networks include
high degree of decentralization, self-organization, multiple administra-
tive domains, low barrier to deployment, organic growth, resilience to
faults and attacks, and abundance and diversity of resources 15,16. How-
ever, in spite of these promising features, existing P2P research offers
only fragments for aworkingDOSN, as each individual component, such
as the overlay network, data management and routing, comes with its
own challenges. Aiello and Ruffo 8 argue that (traditional) P2P systems
are in and of themselves not a complete solution for a couple of reasons.
Firstly, P2P systems such as the structured overlay networks have, in
their unmodified state, many security challenges 17 that make the net-
work unstable. Also, within the P2P open environment, data access is
typically open to everyone which compromises the user’s data privacy.
Lastly, the most P2P overlays offer only very restricted and low-level
APIs while social applications need a suite of higher-level services to
reduce the overhead during the application development. Thus, individ-
ual p2p mechanisms discussed in literature are not ready to user for a
P2P DOSN, but require carefully extension, adaptation and integration
to address the needs in a P2PDOSN.
In this paper, we present LibreSocial, that realizes a satisfactory level
of reliable functionality in form of a P2P framework, adequate social
interaction applications on top and meets the security, privacy and the
essential quality of service (QoS) requirements for a secure decen-
tralized OSN. This work on LibreSocial is motivated by three reasons.
Firstly, the previous works 18,19,20 discussed and evaluated the secu-
rity and privacy aspect of the framework, and 21 focused evaluating the
monitoring functionality of the system. Therefore, although the system
was introduced in parts, the finer details of the frameworkwere not dis-
cussed. Secondly, the framework has experienced many changes over
the last five years, maturing and leading to key insights on the interde-
pendencies of the components. Finally, we present the implementation
and an evaluation of LibreSocial, as current most of the P2P-based
OSN proposed in literature have no tangible implementation that can
be tested in a live environment. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows.
In Section 2, we look at several proposed P2P OSNs, and discuss
their achievements as well as shortcomings. In Section 3, we intro-
duce the concept of the P2P framework by first discussing the technical
requirements needed for the framework and thereafter introduce Libre-
Social (previously called LifeSocial.KOM 18,19,20,22). In Section 4, we intro-
duce the core functions of the P2P overlay which builds on FreePastry,
an implementation of the Pastry overlay 23, highlighting the modifica-
tions so as to suit our application’s needs. Section 5 to 7 discuss the
essential framework component layers of LibreSocial’s system architec-
ture, namely the overlay, the p2p framework, the OSN plugins and the
GUI, showing how the defined requirements are realized. We describe
the evolution of LibreSocial from its former version LifeSocial.KOM
in Section 8 and present in Section 9 the evaluation of LibreSocial. A
conclusion and outlook for future work is given in section 10.
2 RELATEDWORK
An analysis of majority of the DOSN solutions proposed distinguishes
twomain research directions 8. The first direction focuses on the design
of fully-decentralized privacy-aware OSNs. The second direction tries
to meet the privacy goals while assuming an existing central content
provider. In this paper, attention is drawn towards the provision of a
fully-decentralized P2P-based OSN solution, run purely on the devices
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of the users, identifying some examples in literature that offer P2P-
based OSN that are designed based on a clear framework or architec-
ture.
2.1 Peer-to-peer OSNs
There are several proposed OSNs since the advent of LifeSo-
cial.KOM 18,19,20,22 in 2008, which aim at a P2P DOSN platform run
purely on the user devices, mainly to address the privacy concerns
identified in centralized OSNs. In this section, we introduce the most
prominent of these proposals and also briefly mention shortfalls that
we have observed in them.
PeerSoN2 24 is designed with the aim of addressing privacy con-
cerns and ensuring availability. In the system, a solution for the pri-
vacy concern was provided by integration of encryption and access
control mechanism to give a unified user login procedure. Availabil-
ity was addressed through implementation of file sharing procedures.
The architecture of the system is two-tiered in nature and is designed
to decouple the user contents from the control mechanisms. The first
tier is made up of the users and their content, wherein the users can
exchange their content directly. The second tier is the DHT that pro-
vides lookup serviceswhichusers utilize to locate resources, afterwhich
they interact with them directly. This system does not provide much
more than secure content-sharing as would be expected in the sense
of a complete OSN. Therefore, users cannot interact with each other
through messaging services. Also, the system does not offer a replica-
tion scheme while it stores offline messages at the DHT. Additionally,
the system fails in guaranteeing content privacy, user anonymity and
identity management.
Safebook’s 25,26,27 design is aimed at solving three key challenges,
content privacy, resource availability and secure end-to-end commu-
nications. Its infrastructure is made up of three components. The first
consists of several matryoshkas which are social trust based topology
structures that provide distributed data storage. The second is a peer-
to-peer substrate, which is essentially a DHT that provides lookup
services. The last component is a trusted identifier service (TIS) that
ensures protection against DHT type attacks such as Sybil attacks 28
and impersonation attacks. The TIS does not participate in data man-
agementwhich guarantees privacy preservation.Message integrity and
confidentiality is possible due to the secure end-to-end communication
that provides encryption and decryption via a public key infrastructure
(PKI). Like PeerSoN, Safebook also provides secure content-sharing. In
addition, it provides an identity management mechanism and also guar-
antees user privacy and anonymity. The secure transfer of files require a
time consuming multi-hop transmission along trust relationships in the
network. However, Safebook requires trust in friends and will not work
without friends, thus faces a bootstrap problem.
Porkut 29 andMy3 30 are similar proposals by the same authors. They
both focus on enhancing the replication scheme of the system by taking
2http://www.peerson.net
advantage of the overlaps in online times of trusted friends. The fea-
tures of the systems include: a DHT to store meta information of the
user based on a user to trusted proxy set (TPS) mapping; an online time
graphwith the friends of the user as vertices and edges being existent if
there is an overlap in online times between trusted pairs; and a storage
layer that is made by constructing the TPS of a user. In these proposal,
although certain aspects of security are included such as trust, access
control through the TPS and privacy preservation of the index of the
profile content and meta information as well as possibility to use signa-
tures to test authenticity of the DHT entries, they generally lack a clear
definition on the features needed for a fully functional OSN. Also the
systems themselves have not been converted intoworking applications.
eXO 31 is a system that is designed to offer social networking ser-
vices based on a P2P platform. The system is designed to achieve true
autonomy as well as provide support for full user control while sharing
content. Thepublic network ismadeupof theDHTsuchasChord 32,33 or
Pastry 23. The content anduser profiles are stored at theDHTnodes and
are both indexable and accessible through theDHT. This DHT structure
allows queries to be done on the user profiles as desired. The user pro-
files aswell as user’s contentmaybe classed as public andhence indexed
or private and not indexed. To preserve autonomy and privacy, shared
content is only stored at the user’s node and is replicated to adjacent
nodes in the ID space at owner’s request. The system however is very
minimal in what it offers in terms of security, with guarantee for only
access control and anonymity. Other than content sharing, it appears
that as anOSN it offers very limited features.
MyZone 34,35 is a P2P-based OSNwith the goal of solving availability,
resiliency, routing, connectivity, security, traffic optimization and power
management, which are problems common in centralized approaches.
The systemarchitecture has two layers. Thefirst is the service layer that
provides an infrastructure that is partitioning-resilient, dependable on
top of a UDP environment and secure against malicious attacks. This
layer includes the certificate authority, rendezvous servers organized in
a Chord 32,33 ring network that supports searching for peers who have
registered at the servers, the relay server which provides connectivity
betweenpeers that are not directly accessible to each other and a STUN
(Simple Traversal of User datagram protocol (UDP) through Network
address translators) server for UDP connections. The second upper
layer is the application layer that provides OSN specific features and
functionalities such as higher level security policies and profile replica-
tion. For power management control and traffic optimization, MyZone
uses information pulling and versioning. In general, this systemmay not
be considered a pure P2P OSN as it utilizes servers for essential ser-
vices. The system may still be prone to certain security challenges that
are present in centralized systems such as distributed denial-of-service
attacks against the certificate authority and the absence of anonymity.
Cachet 36 was developed as an architecture for social networks that
guarantees security and privacy while simultaneously supporting the
OSN functionalities. It utilizes a hybrid structured-unstructured overlay
in which the DHT is augmented with social links formed by leverag-
ing the social trust relationships between users. The DHT acts as the
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base storage and the social links allow for the formation of a gossip-
based social caching algorithm which reduces the cryptographic and
communication overhead. The social contacts act as caches that store
recent updates. The data objects are stored in decrypted form (reduces
computational overhead) in containers that are protected by a crypto-
graphic structure. The system uses attribute-based encryption (ABE)
techniques for access control. This systemcan however heavily relies on
the existence of friends and trust in them,which implies that if there are
no friends or trust, the OSNmay not work.
DECENT 37 is a decentralized OSN architecture that is designed to
meet the need for flexible data management, support security by pro-
viding confidentiality and data integrity mechanisms as well as access
control policies. Additionally the architecture ensures data availability
by utilizing relevant DHT functionalities. DECENT has a modular archi-
tecture which separates the data objects, cryptographic mechanisms
and the DHT functionalities, allowing them to interact through inter-
faces. Thismodularity offers to the systemdesigner the ability tomake a
choice ofwhich cryptographicmechanismorDHT type to use.However,
though the system has been presented in literature, it is still unclear as
to the existence of a running system that can be compared with in the
public online community.
LotusNet 8 is a framework for the development of P2P-based social
network services designed to support strong user authentication but
with a trade-off between security, privacy and essential services within
theDOSN. Its design allows for defining of privacy settings independent
from the system thus users can fine-tune their own privacy configu-
ration from a selection of several possible privacy policies. It utilizes
Likir 38 as DHT which, first, ensures two-way authentication thus miti-
gating against threats such as Sybil attacks, and secondly, by attaching
owner signed certificates to contents it ensures secure identity-based
resource retrievals. LotusNet provides a custom suite of widgets that
interact with each other in two ways, by exchanging objects through
the DHT which provides the essential network services via the overlay
API, as well as directly with each other if needed. Although the proposal
seems promising, it is however only a proposal and is not yet realized as
a working system.
SuperNova 39 is a proposed system that relies on a super-peer net-
work of volunteer agents and it was designed for purposes of provision
of flexible storage. The users then have a choice of where to store their
content and whose content they want to store. It also includes access
control mechanisms through that allow for three levels, that is, pub-
lic (visible to all), protected (visible to a selected few) and private (not
visible to others), and consequently, the system also provides for full
content ownership. Data availability is enforced by replication to a list
of users called the Storekeepers. The super-peer nodes take part in
the formation of the network control infrastructure, are essentially the
backbone of the network and offer services such as lookup, storage,
bookkeeping, recommendation and others. The shortcomings with this
OSN are: it only supports content sharing and does not provide (pri-
vate) communication options, lacks essential security features such as
anonymity and secure communication, and it is also does not offer an
active implementation.
DiDuSoNet 40 has the goal of utilizing the existing trust relationships
to offer needed services, in particular, trustness, information diffu-
sion and data availability. The system is designed with two layers. The
first layer is a trust-based P2P social overlay in which the connections
between the nodes are similar to social relations of the Dunbar-based
ego networks of a user, with a user’s friend being limited to a predefined
numberof approximately 150 friends calledon theDunbarnumber 41,42.
The second level is the DHT Pastry 23 which provides lookup services
and ensures the system remains robust to churn. A data availability ser-
vice was implemented on the DHT. The system does not implement any
security features but gave suggestions on the use of attribute-based
encryption or a cipher-text attribute-based encryption for security and
asymmetric keys to support access control. The shortcoming in this pro-
posed system is that it does not seek to implement a functional system,
but rather the testing of a trust relationships and data availability via
simulation.
General shortcomings in literature on P2PDOSNare thusmainly the
lack of implementation and thus of a full picture of the overall system,
the limitation of functionality, as well as the heavy reliance on trust in
friends. Based on our decade long experience on building P2P DOSN,
wefind these three points essential to address for a suitable P2PDOSN.
There must be an implementation attempt to identify the shortcomings
and interdependencies of the considered mechanisms and to advance
the architecture. A full set of functions, namely identity management,
access-controlled storage and secure communicationmust be provided,
in order to meet the demands of an OSN and the address the technical
challenges in the combination. And finally, the solutionmust not assume
trust in friends, as OSN use cases require to store highly personal infor-
mation, often referring to these “friends”, without themhaving access to
it. In LibreSocial, we address these three challenges andmore.
3 A P2P FRAMEWORK FORONLINE SOCIAL
NETWORKS
Designing P2P-basedOSNs is a non-trivial task as P2P solutions usually
involve some design complexities. P2P mechanisms for realizing simi-
lar functionalities as in the centralized OSNs can be implemented in a
variety ofways. However, the necessary P2P components can be clearly
defined into a suitable P2P framework, while giving system designers
independence to chose the components based on their need. In this
section, we begin by underlining the necessary technical requirements
in the design of the P2P-based framework to support an OSN applica-
tion. Thereafter, we introduce LibreSocial, an OSN designed based on
the defined technical requirements.
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3.1 Technical Requirements for a P2P-basedOSN
In a centralized OSN, the server stores the data, replies to queries and
enforces the access control as well as other security considerations.
In P2P solutions the same must be achieved in a decentralized fash-
ion, while ensuring quality solely based on the cooperation of unreliable
and potentially malicious user devices (nodes). First, is the need for a
reliable (overlay) network that interconnects all nodes, integrates an
identity management and supports routing messages to nodes/users.
Mechanisms to store data reliably and securely with a fine-grained
access control mechanism are needed. The provision of security and
access control is especially challenging, as no one is to be trusted in
the network, including friends. Trust in friends must not be assumed
since friends in OSNs are typically known but may not be fully trusted
individuals. Beside the data-focused functions, a variety of user-to-user
communication options have to be provided, allowing for secure mes-
sage exchanges with dedicated recipients (unicast/multicast), such as,
for chatting, gamingor videoconferencing.Onceall basic technical func-
tions are provided by a P2P framework, and a reliable and secure P2P
basis of an OSN is created, the various functions of an OSN are to
be implemented, such as the profile, albums, chat or news feed, and
combined in a common graphical user interface. In the following, we
structure the requirements in more detail.
(a) Identity management: Users should be uniquely identifiable using
a set of secure, non-replicable credentials which are secured
to prevents identity hijacks. This can be achieved through an
elaborate, decentralized registration and login process utilizing
cryptographic algorithms for security and privacy 22. Access to
anaccount shouldbepurelybasedonknowledge, as users should
be able to login on various devices and thus all necessities to log
in should not be bound to a specific device.
(b) Efficient routing: Routing protocols are essential to build fur-
ther data and communication structures and require a reliable,
authenticated message delivery. The routing strategy is depen-
dent on theP2Poverlay chosen,with structuredoverlays provid-
ing reliable ID-based routing. These overlays offer logarithmic
routing complexity for a given ID, and the capability of defining
responsibility for actions and data in the system because to the
key-based routing (KBR) interfaces 43, such as distributed hash
tables (DHTs), ensuring keys are associated with addresses (for
data, for nodes, for users) in a given address space.
(c) Relevant communication channels: A powerful and fast communi-
cation platform ensures efficient message passing. Mechanism
that support various communication strategies such as syn-
chronous/asynchronous, unicast/multicast or publish/subscribe
should be incorporated to be able to send messages securely to
individuals or groups while preventing channel clogging due to
high traffic.
(d) Content availability: The content stored should be readily avail-
able and consistent even when the corresponding owner (or her
friends) go offline. This requirement is strongly dependent on
the storage mechanism, the data replication mechanism and the
search/indexingmethod that are implemented in theOSN.
(e) Management of large data sets: In addition to being able to store
simple data within the storage layer, the system should provide
structures that support the storage of large data sets such as
albums or comments. Distributed data structures (DDSs) such as
data lists (e.g. for albums), sets (e.g. friends) or on general linked
data graphs (e.g. forum discussions) can be incorporated to sup-
port large data sets. The data structures also enable the per-
forming of complex data queries that are normally not possible
in simple key-value storage solutions.
(f) User & group management: Users are identified through unique
user identifiers (userIDs). The users should be able to change
their credentials without affecting their userID. The userID is
used in friend lists, in directed communication as well as for the
access permissions on the data. A group is a virtual user that
is the union of several users and can be addressed in the com-
munication and also in the data access permissions. By being
able to add groups as members of other groups, hierarchies can
be built that match given organization structures of the users.
Thus, access rights can be clearly assigned to users and groups.
Both users and groups can be affected by identity theft, thus it
is desired that the overlay provides mitigation against such to
ensuremessages are sent by known and authenticated users.
(g) Security management: The users should be authenticated before
using the network. The system should support the implementa-
tion of a suitable access control mechanism in combination with
a suitable replication mechanisms so that users can individually
pick who can access which of their data to enforce data privacy
requirements. The use of digital signatures to sign the content
will ensure that users can verify that the data is untampered,
correct and authenticated. Finally, the communication channels
should be secured through the use of appropriate cryptographic
methods for end-to-end encryption.
(h) Quality monitoring and evaluation: Running a large-scale, dis-
tributed system always bears the risk of unpredictable behavior,
this must be identified and addressed autonomously by the sys-
tem itself.Monitoring of the overall performance helps to expose
the inherent failures and hidden strengths of the system. It pro-
vides a way of reviewing the quality of service (QoS) of the
system. By reviewing data gathered from the monitoring pro-
cess against the expectation on performance, strategies can be
implemented that address the shortfalls in quality in specific
situations. Continual system testing allows the developers and
later the system itself to ensure that the QoS definitions are
consistently met.
(i) Customizable suite of application plugins: It is desirable to imple-
ment the OSN application in a modular fashion. The various
components can thus interactwith each other as plugins through
supplied interfaces and use the P2P functions provided by a
wrapped P2P framework. This makes it possible to add or
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FIGURE 1Overview of a proposed P2POSN architecture
remove plugins without affecting the entire system, allowing
addition of distributed app repositories. This gives the applica-
tion the ability to be dynamic andmore interesting.
(j) Appealing Graphical User Interface (GUI): Integrates the visualiza-
tion of various OSN plugins in a structuredmanner.
In Section3.2, the technical requirementsdefinedhere are realized in
the implementation of LibreSocial, our P2P-based OSN solution, which
we introduce and describe further in the consequent sections.
3.2 LibreSocial: A P2P-basedOSN
We propose LibreSocial, a P2P-based OSN that is designed based on
the defined technical requirements given in Section 3.1. In Fig. 1, the
technical requirements are put together into a proposed framework for
a P2P-based OSN. The architecture of LibreSocial has been designed
based on the Open Services Gateway Initiative (OSGi) service platform
with the goal of making it easy to add/remove services. The architec-
ture consists of four layers namely: 1. the P2P overlay, 2. P2P framework,
3. plugins and applications, and 4. the graphical user interface (GUI).
Themost important aspect of this architecture is that it can also pro-
vide support for the deployment of any other P2P application (in form
of a set of alternative plugins) by simply separating the OSN plugins
from the overlay and the framework which can then be used for the
new application. This is possible because of the strong P2P framework
in the middle summarizing all essential P2P functions in an abstracted
manner. TheOSGi service platform, implementing a local service bundle
orchestration, further permits the adaptation of the system to any other
application as desired, with possible code reuse. Parts of this system
has been previously published under the term LifeSocial.KOM 18,19,20,22
which was renamed due to naming conflicts. In the following sections,
we discuss in detail how each of the layers is realized.
4 OVERLAY: AHEAVILYMODIFIED FREEPASTRY
Pastry 23 is a generic P2P routing and object location scheme whose
nodes forms a structured P2P overlay that is completely decentralized,
fault-resilient, scalable and reliable. FreePastry3 is a readily available
open source implementation of Pastry that was developed at Rice Uni-
versity and is extensively usedwithin the research community.
The choice of Pastry, and in this case, FreePastry, as the overlay in
LibreSocial mainly because it comes bundled with many other simple
but useful P2P-based tools which are needed in LibreSocial. These tools
includes PAST 46,47 (a replication scheme for simple key-value pairs),
Scribe 48 (a simple multicast event notification infrastructure) and Split-
Stream 49 (a multicast streaming system that uses Scribe). These sim-
ple and highly limited tools can be directly accessed without need for
further installation/configurations. In addition, FreePastry offers key-
based routing functionality 43, hence it strives to achieve reliable ID-
based routing. In LibreSocial, FreePastry has been heavily extended to
provide secure identity management, secure and parallel routing man-
agement among other modifications to adapt it to the needs of the
system.We discuss these further below.
4.1 Initial identitymanagement
FreePastry relies on the use of DHTs for routing data in the network.
Therefore ID management is based on the DHT. We look at how the
identity space is created and how the identifiers are constructed
Identity space: The DHTs utilize a predefined ID space of size 2160
for all nodes which can be viewed as a circular structure in which the
successor of the highest ID is the lowest ID, that is 0, hence a ring net-
work. Peers are responsible for the IDs closest to them. Pastry defines
the closest nodeasonehavinganodeIDwith the longest possiblematch-
ing prefix to the desired ID. Each peer maintains a routing table with
entries pointing to other peers in exponentially growing distances. Also
a leaf setwith the numerically closest nodes in the ring is maintained.
The constructionof the routing table ensures that it is alwayspossible to
find a node that is closer to any ID. If no peer is identified as being close
to a given ID, the current peer becomes responsible for this ID.
Identifier construction: Every peer in the initial ring has a unique
numeric identifier called the nodeID that is generated randomly for each
node. Each nodeID is a 160-bit value, with the values of the nodeID’s
being uniformly distributed over the numeric space in which the iden-
tifiers are picked from. This random assignment of nodeID’s ensures,
with high probability, that nodes with adjacent nodeID’s are diverse in
geography, ownership, jurisdiction, network attachment and so on. The
overlay also offers an efficient routing functionality. Given a numeric
value in the 160-bit numeric space and amessage, the overlay is capable
of efficiently routing the message to the network node whose identifier
is numerically closest to the given numeric value.
3http://www.freepastry.org/FreePastry/
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4.2 Initial Message routing
Themessage routing process is made possible by the routing algorithm.
We discuss the routing algorithm and its constructs, that is the routing
table and the leaf set.
Routing algorithm: Given a network that consists of N nodes, the
overlay’s routing algorithm guarantees that the message will be deliv-
ered to the recipient node inO(log2N) steps. At each routing step, the
message is forwarded to a node whose nodeID shares key whose prefix
is at least one digit longer than the prefix that the key shares with the
present node’s ID. If such a node is unknown, the message is forwarded
to a node whose nodeID shares a prefix with the key as long as the cur-
rent node, but is numerically closer to the key than the present node’s
ID. The routing algorithm in the initial FreePastry takes advantage of
three data structures, the leaf set and a routing table, which are different
for each node and help the node keep track of its immediate neighbors.
Routing table: This is organized intoO(log2bN) rows (b being a con-
figuration parameterwith typical value of 4)with a total of 2b−1 entries
in each row. The 2b − 1 entries at a given row n refer to a node whose
nodeID shares the current node’s nodeID in the first n digits but whose
n+1th digit has one of the 2b−1 possible values other than then+1th
digit in the present node’s ID.
Leaf set: The leaf set L refers to the node set with the |L|/2 numer-
ically closest larger nodeIDs, and the |L|/2 nodes with numerically
closest smaller nodeIDs, in reference to the current node’s nodeID. The
leaf set is especially important during the process of message routing.
Pastry further considers a neighborhood setwhich holds nodeIDs and
IP addresses of the |M | nodes closest (based on the proximity met-
ric) to the current local node. The neighborhood set is used in routing
messages as well as maintaining locality properties. In FreePastry the
neighborhood set is not implemented.
4.3 Overlaymodifications
In order to create a foundation for security in the overlay as well as pro-
vide support for heterogeneous nodes within the context of the OSN,
it is necessary to make severe changes to the FreePastry design and
implementation. These changes are summarized herein. We present
a further in depth analysis on the construction of P2P overlays with
desired properties in this dissertation 55.
4.3.1 Secure nodeID
In LifeSocial, asymmetric cryptography was provided using a 1024-bit
RSA algorithm 50 which necessitated modification on how FreePastry
works so as to accommodate the 1024-bit as opposed to a 160-bit
nodeID. This has been changed in LibreSocial to elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy (ECC) 51,52 with 160-bit keys which nowmatches the initial require-
ments of FreePastry while provide strong encryption with minimal
overhead. Also symmetric cryptography is provided using the advanced
encryption standard (AES) algorithm 53,54 with a 128-bit key size. We
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FIGURE 2 UserID to NodeIDmapping
now consider the process of registration, and profile and userID cre-
ation, immutable and associated to a user in contrast to the nodeID,
which is mutable and associated to a node.
Registration procedure: The registration process of a new user
requires that there is a network, i.e. another member present to act as
the bootstrap node, else the new user will become the first node in the
network. Based on the user name and passphrase the user generates an
asymmetric key pair. The 160-bit public key is used as the nodeID dur-
ing the creation of the Pastry Node associated to this user. The user can
change the nodeID atwill by simply regenerating a new set of keys.With
the nodeID being a public key, all communication to this node can be
encrypted and any signatures from a node can be verified directly.
Profile and UserID management: A profile item is created once a
new user is able to join the network, which can then be fully or partially
encrypted using a symmetric key for confidentiality and stored with the
public key as the nodeID inside the network. Because the nodeID can
change, it cannot be used as a unique identifier for the user, to help
users identify each other. Therefore an immutable userID is also gen-
erated once when the user’s profile is created. To map the nodeID to
the userID, a mapping-item is created, which is stored at the userID in
the overlay and lists what the corresponding nodeID to the userID is. In
order to prevent attackers from illegally overwriting the mapping-item,
it is required that the overwriting node verifies that it is in posses-
sion of the claimed asymmetric key pair through a challenge-response
approach. Additionally, several other mapping-items are also stored in
the network to map the userID to the current nodeID so that other
nodes can find out the current nodeID of a given known userID. This is
shown in Figure 2. The routing algorithm is used to retrieve this map-
ping item. By this approach, users can log in to their account from any
machine, as the keys and credentials are purely created from their user-
name and passphrase, i.e. their knowledge. By storing the nodeID (=
public key) as a signed data item under the userID, nodes can identify
the location of their contact in the network. Any communication to this
node can now be encrypted and signatures from this node verified.
4.3.2 Parallel and iterative routing
The routing table has been extended to contain not just one entry per
routing entry but a bucket of multiple peer addresses as in the DHT
8 GRAFFI ET AL
Kademlia 58. Instead of forwarding a message to only one single node
from the routing table, in LibreSocial a requesting node will deliver
messages to k different peers in parallel. The requesting node waits to
receive the responses and then sends the message to the new k most
promising peers. This process is iterated until the target peer is identi-
fied and themessages is delivered. This significantly reduces the impact
of interferenceduring themessage routing process by amalicious nodes
and has been proven successful in Kademlia 58 as well. However, to fully
realize the benefits of this technique requires two optimization prob-
lems to be solved: termination of redundant messages after successful
lookup and rejection of further suggestion after forwarding ofmessages
is done.
4.3.3 Weak nodes
In FreePastry all participating nodes are treated as equal. In reality,
node capacities differ and some nodes are incapable of contributing to
the network, either due to short participation times, missing storage
capacity or limited bandwidth. These nodes should be able to use the
services in theoverlaybut shouldnotbevisible otherwise, that is, should
not be in charge of routing and storing data. To achieve this, the weak
nodes are labeled with specific markers, implemented as specific port
numbers, during the joining process. As the IP and port numbers are
available throughout the code, at any relevant position in the code it can
be considered to treat weak nodes differently. In specific, the informa-
tion about weak nodes is not spread in routing, only appear in leaf sets
andhenceusedonly forfinalmessagedelivery. In the replicationprocess
these nodes are ignored. Thus, we ensure that these nodes do not store
data and do not participate in routing, both ofwhich are taken care of by
strong nodes.
5 THE P2P FRAMEWORK
The P2P framework is a toolbox of essential services and mechanisms
that are practical and used by several applications. The provision of
these fundamental, and often required, functions is done in form of
collections which smoothens the implementation of higher level appli-
cations by providing a clear interface and hiding the complexities of
the underlying, challenging overlay. The P2P framework we present
provides a selected set of functions for storage and replication, access
control, distributed data structures to support large data set manage-
ment, secure communication, user and group management, and testing
and monitoring. It builds on the underlying P2P overlay, which itself
only provides vary basic routing functions, to create a reliable and
secure interface of convenient distributed functions to build either a
P2P-basedOSN on top or any other P2P application.
5.1 Storage and Replication
The importance of data availability within any OSN cannot be over-
stated. While the modified FreePastry provides simple routing and a
simple data storage, data can get lost if the storing node goes offline.
LibreSocial builds on PAST 46,47 to handle storage. PAST was a natural
choice for handling storage because it is already integrated with FreeP-
astry, and also includes replication management. In the following we
discuss how PAST handles files management and replication as well as
the extensions to PAST to support features that were not present.
5.1.1 FileManagement
When a user joins the network, the user avails a small percentage of
their storage space for network usage. This ensures that the applica-
tion can perform functions such as replication. Key file management
functions include addressing and storage, and file operations which we
discuss further.
File addressing and storage:Files stored using PAST, like nodes in the
network, are also addressed using a 160-bit identifier, referred to as
the fileID. This fileID is calculated either by hashing the file itself,
being then unique and unchangeable for this given file, or, alternatively,
the fileID is created by hashing a reproducible string, such as the user
name and the function of the data object, for example, under the hash
of “Alice__Albums” the data item listing the albums of Alice could be
found. An inserted file is stored at the node whose nodeIDmost closely
matches the prefix of the fileID, and the node that stores this file is
found using FreePastry’s routing algorithm.
File operations: The fileID is used to perform INSERT, REQUEST,
UPDATE andDELETE operations. PASTwasmodified so as to provide the
UPDATE and DELETE of files functionalities, which were previously not
supported.
5.1.2 Replication
The other important function that PAST provides is data redundancy
support via replication which helps guarantee data availability in case
the data owner is offline. In addition, LibreSocial incorporated a data
caching extension is included to improve data access. There is also func-
tional support for load and traffic balancing to ensure replicated data
storage and access is evenly distributed among the nodes. These are
discussed herein.
Replication process: PAST provides replicationmanagement, so that
a file stored at a node x is replicated to k − 1 additional nodes, where
these k − 1 nodes are the next closest nodes based on the fileID and
may also be found in x’s leaf set. To ensure that the k replicas of a file
were actually created, every successful replicating node transmits an
acknowledgment, called a store receipt, back to the node that performed
the insertion. We adapted PAST’s initial replication mechanism to not
only check whether a given fileID is available at the replica nodes
but to actually check the hash of this file, otherwise file updates would
not have been propagated. To support efficient replication, as well as
reduce system and traffic overload, caching mechanisms as well as load
balancing for storage and traffic are incorporated.
Local caching mechanism: The response time of the application is
improved through the use of an internal caching mechanism introduced
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on top of PAST. It holds data items recently retrieved thus reducing the
need for resolving subsequent requests for the same content within the
next short period of time. The time forwhich the data is served from the
cache is chosen carefully to limit the traffic in the network, but also to
maintain a freshness of the data and to consider potential updates.
Storage load balancing: There may arise a situation in which a par-
ticular node may not have sufficient storage space or may limit it for
various reasons. In such a case, a nodemay reject a request to store afile
or replica. However, the system takes care of such a shortfall by provid-
ing replica diversion. Replica diversion is used as the first option when it
comes to load balancing and is aimed at balancing the load within a leaf
setL. A nodex that is experiencing storage space shortage and receives
a request will delegate the request to another numerically close node y
within its leaf set that hasmore storage available butwas not previously
selected for replicating the respective file. If y accepts to store the data,
x then stores a pointer to y. So as to guarantee availability, a pointer to
y is stored in the k + 1th closest node z, making z responsible for the
replica in casex fails, thus fulfilling the need for k replicatedfiles. In case
all the nodes in the leaf set of x have reached their storage limit, then
file diversion is initiated and the file is distributed to another part of the
nodeID space in PAST by selecting a different salt so as to generates a
different fileID. File diversion ensures a balance in the remaining free
storage space in different portions of the nodeID space in PAST and the
delegation of the data storage task does not violate the anonymity of
the data owner as the data is encrypted and the node storing the data
cannot read it unless it has been granted permission by the data owner.
Traffic load balancing: In most cases, when an overload occurs, the
storage capacity is not the limiting factor but the bandwidth of the node
responsible for a popular item. If an item is requested very frequently,
the node might use all its bandwidth to send out that item and still not
be able to process all the requests. We extended PAST to harness, in
such cases, the large group of file receivers to spread out the data them-
selves. For that the responsible node maintains a list of receivers and
forwards the file request to individual nodes from this list 45. Which
previous receiver is selected can be chosen based on various factors.
However, for popular files, many receivers are available to serve the file
even further. As this step is optional, it only improves the performance
and does not induce consistency or replication issues. In case of a file
update, the list of previous file receivers is emptied and reset.
5.2 Access control
Access control mechanisms are needed to ensure that only authorized
users read from and write to data items in the network. Authorized
users are generally also selected friends and these are stored in a
friend list. LibreSocial achieves access control through the use of cryp-
tographic keys. For write access, we differentiate between a first write
operation and the following update operations.
First write operation: For an unused dataID, anyone is free to write
thisfirst instance of the data, as no access rights are violated. The owner
of the data object generates a symmetric cryptographic key which is
used to encrypt the storage item. The symmetric key is then individually
encryptedwith thepublic keys of eachuser or groupwho shall have read
rights. This encrypted data item is signed and combined with the public
key of the owner as well as the list of encrypted keys builds the secure
storage item, which is then stored simply in the network under the pre-
viously unused dataID. The public key of the owner or group is stored
together with the signed itemwhen it is first inserted.
File update: It is possible to update, that is, overwrite, the data with
a new secure storage item if it is signed with the corresponding private
key belonging to a specified public key, after it has been verified by the
node where the data object is stored. Fig. 3 shows an example of how
LibreSocial secures an item using the symmetric and asymmetric keys
as well as how it provides access to the item via the list of individual
encryptions of the symmetric key corresponding to the data item. The
new secure storage item is only accepted and replicated when the same
data owner provides the data update.
Read access: Reading of the data item requires retrieving of the
data and having the right private key for the decryption of the individ-
ually encrypted symmetric key which is then used to decrypt the data.
In a hierarchical group, the symmetric key is retrieved using a depth-
first traversal through the group hierarchy. Thus, anyone may have the
Secure Storage Item, e.g. as replicating node, but only the users selected
by the owner can decrypt and read it.
5.3 Distributed Data Structures
PAST 46,47 uses a DHT data structure which supports storing of sin-
gle item objects. Therefore, it is only possible to perform simple key-
value lookups. For an OSN, the goal is to be able to store large data
sets, such as albums, comment lists and friend lists, and provide mech-
anisms that can support execution of complex search queries, such
as range queries, aggregation queries, k nearest neighbors (k-NN)
queries, multi-attribute queries and so on. Using PAST solely as the
storage mechanism will not achieve this. Additionally, several secu-
rity control measures such as access control mechanisms that support
read/write/append/delete privilege checking for files should be easily
integratable.
To achieve this, we build distributed data structures (DDSs) on top
of the PAST’s DHT. The DDSs consist of a dataID, usually a unique hash
function under which they are referenced, an optional payload, as well
as an optional list of pointers to other dataIDs 18, allowing to build data
graphs. The object is retrievable from the DHT if the dataID is known.
This offers two possibilities of designing the DDS. In the first possibility,
the item is stored under a hard-coded hash which is known to all net-
work nodes. The items in this case are hard-coded entry points for the
structure traversal. The second possibility is to store the object under
its own hash and then store the pointer to this hash in another item.
To support random data retrievals within the network’s graph struc-
ture, the first design option is preferred, that is, the item is stored
as an entry point. For example the album set of user Alice is stored
under the hash of the string "Alice-Albums". In this situation, due to
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many abstraction layers and the high level of redirection that occurs,
high latency may occur during the process of the pointer/hash initiated
traversals in the P2P overlay. In any case, every level of redirection,
including multiple hops, eventually leads to a 1-to-1 communication
over the P2P overlay. This scenario has the advantage that it is now pos-
sible to split some seemingly large objects, such as photo albums, into
smaller parts and identify only a single object that holds a list of hashes
for all the parts are pointers to further parts. It then becomes possi-
ble to handle persistent data in a better manner, as well as provide a
cleaner abstraction over the P2P overlay for the storage and retrieval of
graphs connected through these hash pointers but with the possibility
of latency due to redirections and additional layers.
LibreSocial supports storage of large data sets by integrating three
distributed data structures (DDSs) into the framework, namely, dis-
tributed linked list, distributed set and prefix hash tree. The DDSs are
built on top of the DHT that the modified PAST provides, with different
APIs and entry points for each DDS, hence no interaction takes place
between them. A discussion on the three structures follows.
5.3.1 Distributed sets & linked list
A set is a data structure that is an unordered collection of unique mem-
bers/elements, and each member of the set may be either a set or a
primitive element referred to as an atom. A list is a sequence of zero
or more elements of a given type, in which the elements are linearly
ordered according to their position on the list. A linked list is a list in
which elements in the list have pointers to the next element in the
list. Sets can be represented by linked lists, where the items in the list
are elements of the set. This way the system developer can design the
system without worrying about the usage of contiguous memory for
storing a list, reducing the process of shifting elements to make room
for new elements or closing up of any gaps created due to deletion of
elements. But this is at the cost of additional storage space for the point-
ers. In LibreSocial, sets are used to manage friends, uploaded files and
albums while lists are used in comment sequences, forums and in the
inbox.
Storage in distributed manner on various nodes is done by splitting
the list of data items into buckets of a defined size, each containing a
given range of the data items of the whole data structure and then dis-
tributed to the nodes in the network. The bucket size, s, depends on the
size of items to be stored by the user, and is a data structure parameter.
The structure itself is in essence an array and all items from the inter-
val [s · (m − 1), s · m − 1] for m ∈ N are stored in a bucket named
structurename_m, wherem is the interval ID and N is a set of all net-
work nodes. This is represented in Figure 4. In case the index of an item
is known, the remote node responsible for the bucket is also known and
can be contacted directly, thus additional latency is in the form of one
redirection. The distributed sets/lists can be used to store structured
data in form of data graph stored in the network as shown in Fig. 5.
5.3.2 PrefixHash Trees
The prefix hash tree 59 (PHT) is a trie-based distributed data structure
that was designed with the sole purpose of supporting more sophisti-
cated queries over aDHT, specifically, it allows running of range queries,
heap queries, proximity queries and multidimensional analogues of
these queries. It relies on the lookup interface of theDHT to construct a
trie-based structure and does not need to know how the DHT topology
looks like or how the DHT performs routing. In LibreSocial, the use of
thePHTsmake it possible toperformrange searches. This allows search-
ing for content that falls within a predefined range, such as users by age.
PHTs store key-value pairs.
Assuming an alphabet that consists only of binary digits, hence keys
are represented as binary numbers, and that every leaf node stores at
mostM keys. The PHT structure begins with a single node stored at a
given leaf node. Insertion of a key,K , will first result in a lookup oper-
ation to locate the leaf node that stores K . The insertion process may
then cause the leaf node to split into two children followed by redis-
tribution of the keys. Generally, the M + 1 keys are then distributed
between the two children such that each of them stores at most M
keys. This splitting process can cascade further downwards the PHT.
The PHT structure formed is a binary trie. The beauty of the PHT is the
way in which the logical trie is distributed among the peers in the net-
work (how the PHT vertices are distributed to the DHT nodes). This is
achieved by hashing the prefix labels of PHT nodes over theDHT identi-
fier space. Using this hash-based assignment, it is possible to locate the
corresponding PHT nodes using only a single DHT lookup. This offers a
faster method of locating data over the distributed sets and distributed
linked list. ThePHTallows the rangequeries to locateobjects.Given two
keysA andB (A ≤ B), the range query returns all the keysK contained
in the PHT that satisfyA ≤ K ≤ B.
5.3.3 DDS security and access control
All of these distributed data structures incorporate cryptographically
enforced access control mechanisms. Confidentiality is typically pro-
vided through directed encryption with the public keys of the read
enabled users. Integrity is provided through the signature of the
author, which is stored alongside the encrypted/unencrypted data. Data
updates, that is, the overwriting or deletion of data, requires the signa-
ture of the previous author to take effect. All replicating nodes consider
this and thus a majority of the replica holders must confirm that the
changes are valid.
The need for such advanced access control options is seen in the
functionality of the news wall of every user. This social networking spe-
cific feature gives each user a personal wall page that they can post
entries to. Other users can also post to another user’s personal page
and also comment on those posts if they have been accepted as friends.
Usersmayalso alter their comments or evendelete them. Entries of oth-
ers must not be altered. Even the owner of the news wall cannot alter
the entries of others, butmay delete the entry in total. Thewall is imple-
mented as distributed list, in which the users and his friends can add
entries (to the DDS list), others do not have read rights. Also each DDS
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list entry is secured andmay only be altered by its initial author. A friend
who wrote a comment can edit his comment by replacing the comment
object under the same dataIDwith a valid signature of the same owner
as the previous comment. He even may mark the comment as deleted,
that is, overwrite it with a tombstone object, which is treated in the pre-
sentation differently. The owner of a wall can delete a complete entry,
by removing the pointer to that comment from his wall item, which he
owns, but not thewording in the entry, which would required to replace
the comment at the comment’s data item ID in the DHT, which is not
allowed, as he cannot present a valid signature from the previous owner.
The same applies for comments on photos in photo albums and entries
in the forum of a group. As the access control is enforced by the P2P
framework, the applications and plugins do not have to hassle with the
complexity of the access control enforcement. In the dissertation 56, we
present the DDS concept in full detail.
5.4 Communication Channels
The communication channel refers to the point where themessages are
exchanged between users. The channel either pushes messages (which
requires a callback function) or pulls messages from (which requires
constant probing) from other nodes. A message sent in a particular
channel can only be received at nodes that are in this channel. The
following are aspects of the communication channel that have been
designed and implemented in LibreSocial.
5.4.1 Unicast, multicast and aggregation
LibreSocial supports both synchronous and asynchronous messaging. It
also provides support for unicast (1-to-1) messaging such as in direct
messaging, multicast (1-to-N) messaging such as streaming to a group
of users, and aggregation (N-to-M) to distribute and aggregate informa-
tion in the network. P2P overlay networks support lookupswhich reach
the destination node within several hops. However when there is low
latency or high throughput, it is preferable to communicate directlywith
other nodes. This is achieved through IP-based communication, where
the node retrieves the IP information of the other node once and uses
it to communicate directly without additional hops to other nodes, such
as in streaming and file transfers. Asynchronous messaging is achieved
through the storage of messages encrypted for and stored in the inbox
of the recipient. An inbox is a data structure located in the DHT, which
permits the INSERT of messages, but prohibits READ, UPDATE and
DELETE access to unauthorized users. Once the recipient is online, he
checks thepresenceofmessages inhis inbox, retrieves themanddeletes
them from the inbox.
5.4.2 Publish/Subscribe (pub/sub)
This allows users to communicate with each other without the knowl-
edge of each others addresses. The messages are published to topic
channels that the users have subscribed to. Pub/sub is implemented
using Scribe 48 with support for caching of created topics. Scribe creates
a minimal spanning tree for all participants in the pub/sub channel and
delivers messages from any origin to all subscribers.
5.4.3 Streaming via SplitStream
Streaming can be visualized as a high bandwidth 1-to-N communica-
tion, hence is different from a basic file transfer. LibreSocial supports
streaming using SplitStream 49 which allows minimization of the upload
bandwidth requirement by equally distributing theworkload and ensur-
ing that nodes which consume also participate in routing. Support for
order preservation is integrated and canbe enabled or disabled depend-
ing on the application plugin requirements as this includes an overhead.
In essence the P2P framework supports transmission of low overhead
streaming data that is already properly formatted. Also, there are addi-
tional options for resending of lost packets and using checksums to
verify received data.
5.4.4 Streaming viaWebRTC
While the streaming option through SplitStream routes data flows from
one P2P framework instance (node) to another, there is often the need
for simple, low latency audio and video conferencing. This use case
is addressed through WebRTC which is provided by the browser and
allows browsers to connect to each other. Having access to the web-
cam and microphone allows to set up conferencing tools. In this case,
the data flow takes place between browser instances and does not pass
12 GRAFFI ET AL
through the P2P framework. This side-channel is the only exception to
the aim tomanage all data and communication in the P2P framework.
5.4.5 Securemessage channel
The nodeIDs in the network are public keys. Thus, any communication
can be encrypted and signed. To ensure that the messages are secured,
they can be encrypted either by a symmetric key or using the asymmet-
ric key depending on the communication channel that is to be used. If
themessage is intended foronlyone recipient, thenonly theasymmetric
key encryption is applied. If it is meant for a group, then the symmet-
ric key is applied and then the public key of the receiving user which is
identical to the nodeID to which the message is sent to. As the sender’s
nodeID is also it’s public key, the recipient can easily verify themessage.
5.5 Monitoring and Testing
Running a large-scale distributed P2P system bears the risk of unfore-
seen emerging performance issues. In order to identify the quality and
performanceof thenetwork, there is need for a reliablemonitoring solu-
tion. LibreSocial performs tree-basedmonitoringusing SkyEye.KOM 60,61
(or simply SkyEye). SkyEye works by implementing a further overlay on
top of the P2P network and arranges the nodes into a tree structure
as shown in Fig. 6. Every node collects local measurement for certain
pre-defined metrics while at the same time receiving metrics from its
own child nodes (if it has any child nodes) and aggregates these received
values with its own. After performing the collection and aggregation,
the nodes sends these metrics to its pre-calculated parent node in the
tree which continues this process to the root node. The parent sends
an acknowledgmentmessage (ACK).Messages consist of statistics, such
as average, minimum,maximum, sum and standard deviation, to various
metrics, suchas theobserved response time, bandwidthusageandmuch
more. Thus from the leaves up to the root of the tree, the statistics of the
various measurements are aggregated and the root compiles the final
aggregation: the global view on the whole network. This information is
gradually tickled down to all nodes in the network through the acknowl-
edgment (ACK) messages. For that, every time a parent node receives
an aggregation update message from its child node, it sends as confir-
mation anACKmessagewhich contains the aggregated global view that
the parent received prior from its own parent node. Thus, eventually all
nodes receive the global view through ACK messages in the network.
This is shown in Fig. 7.
We elaborate the long term vision for monitoring and management
in 62,63 and the dissertations 21,57. We describe a control loop for the
P2P system tomonitor itself, analyze the observation, plan a correction
strategy and execute it through the distributed adaptation of the sys-
temparameters.With SkyEyewehave a viewon the global performance
of the network in each node. A quorum of nodes around the root in the
monitoring tree is set in charge to analyze these observation in compar-
ison to given performance goals, such as a maximum response time or
maximum hop count in routing. In case they observe a quality degrada-
tion, counter commands are initiated, for example, to increase the rout-
ing table sizes, through the back channel to all nodes using the ACKs. By
adapting the routing table sizemore/less newcontacts have tobe estab-
lished leading to shorter/longer routing paths and thus response times.
We have shown in simulation that metric intervals can be defined and
reached through such a distributed control loop from both sides, that
is, both in lowering the average hop count (when the response time is
“too high”) and in raising the hop count (when the response time is high
but the maintenance traffic should be lowered). However, for an inte-
gration in LibreSocial it is needed to adapt the framework so that the
configuration of the system can be adapted during runtime, which is not
trivial.
Testing of the system allows the developers to find bugs that exist in
the system, whilemonitoring allows the system users to find out exactly
how the system operates in general. This does not interfere with the
security goal, as only statistics are obtained but no personal data. In
LibreSocial, there are two parts that are considered important for test-
ing, a) the application and its plugins, and b) the modifications in the
overlay and the framework. LibreSocial includes a TestPluginwhich sup-
ports defining single test cases as well as longer test plans that execute
multiple actions sequentially in predefined time slots. Actions refer to all
possible interaction options that a user can to, thus allowing to emulate
user behavior in a controlled environment. It also provides the option
to randomly execute test cases. Every predefined test case must stipu-
late its own preconditions., such as having an album before uploading
photos. The test plugin checks the fulfillment of all preconditions. The
test plans make it possible to efficiently test new plugins, updates of
themaswell as theperformanceand costs of theoverlay andP2P frame-
work in general. To test the various plugins, the test plugin accesses the
API of the plugins used by graphical user interface which guarantees a
functional API as well.
5.6 AppStore - Repositories for (OSN) Plugins
The AppStore is an independent plugin extension for repository based
app/plugin management. The development of the AppStore was pos-
sible due to the extendable nature of LibreSocial as a result of the
plugin-based, OSGi architecture. The AppStore serves as a springboard
upon which users can create an exclusive “AppStore” that they them-
selves manage, similarly to the apt-repositories in Gnu/Linux. Anyone
will be able act as a publisher, host his ownApp repository and advertise
it to various groups or all users. Publishers can instantiate reposito-
ries, browse and search through their catalog, publish, manage, down-
load and install different apps, as well as share the repository address
(dataID) with other users. Users can browse the catalog and only down-
load and install the Apps. A repository is shared with other users by
sharing the repository ID via email, chat or direct message with them,
after which they simply search for the repository ID. The repository is
technically aDDSwithmetadata andfileIDentries. TheApps are techni-
cally OSGi bundles that include the app metadata and a .jar file that can
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be installeddynamically at runtimeby theusers.Apps are storedunder a
dataID using the storage functions. The AppStore provides three views.
(a) Publisher view: A view tomanage the content of a repository.
(b) User view: Browse and install Apps from a given repository.
(c) Installed Apps view: Personalized repository listing the Apps
installed by the user. Allows to automatically download and
install the preferred Apps when using a new device. Users can
delete the Apps installed from here.
With this setup the framework is open to any kind of further extension
independent of the initial App provider of the framework, anyone can
provide OSGi bundles as (OSN) Apps. This general applicability moti-
vated the P2P framework, which aims to support generic use cases and
functions and does not focus on specific applications such as OSN.
5.7 Other supporting components
In addition to the P2P features discussed in the framework, there
are three other important components integrated into the framework.
These are the Storage Dispatcher, the Message Dispatcher and the Infor-
mation Cache. The component framework shown in Figure 8 shows the
general placement of these components in the architecture.
The Storage Dispatcher provides storage services for the platform-
specific data objects, both locally and remotely. It keeps track of the
application data being stored. All data objects and messages in Libre-
Social extend a common class called SharedItem, having a storage key,
header and thedataobject itself,making it a storableobject. TheStorage
Dispatcher acts as a local stub and performs efficient storage, retrieval,
update and removal operations on the data object using the P2P frame-
work. Execution of these operation can be either synchronous or asyn-
chronous and aremanagedby the StorageDispatcher through calling the
right P2P functions in the framework.
TheMessage Dispatcher is used to create instances of different types
of communication channels, namely, the MessageChannel, TopicChan-
nel and AggregationChannel. The MessageChannel interface supports
bi-directional 1-to-1 communication. It sends messages to a defined
address and allows registering of a listener that is notified whenever
a new message arrives at that particular MessageChannel. Each Mes-
sageChannel has a unique name to identify it. TheMessageChannel also
supports 1-to-N communication after defining a list of receivers that a
particular message is to be sent to. The TopicChannel interface uses a
publish/subscribemechanism. It sends amessage to every node that has
registered to a particular TopicChannel, e.g. participants in a chat room.
The AggregationChannel is used to combine data on a global/network
scale, used in SkyEye. In order for nodes to provide data, they must add
a sensor and to receive combined/aggregated data, the node must reg-
ister a callback. The aggregation of the sensor data takes place in the
AggregationServer which is in the backend.
The Information Cache acts as a cache for objects, either data objects
or storedmessages, requested by the higher layers from the distributed
storage. These requested objects are expected to change infrequently,
hence can be kept in the cache so that subsequent requests can be
served locally direct to the Apps/GUI to minimize network traffic due
to repeated requests. The cache size is configurable and the caching
strategy employed in LibreSocial is the least recently used (LRU) strat-
egy. The use of the Information Cache allows exempting the plugins in
the upper layers fromhandling asynchronous events. The plugins simply
decide the objects they need at any particular time and retrieve it from
the cache. Such data may either be available, already requested or not
available. In case of unavailability, the plugin then requests for it, leaving
the cache to initiate the lookup for the requested object and to process
the irregularly incoming data.
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5.8 Summary of the P2P Framework
The framework is a collection of (advanced) P2P functions to harness
the resources in the overlay, hide the complexities and to provide inter-
faces for advanced applications on top. PAST provides replication func-
tionality and has been extended to support access control, security,
heterogeneity and also load balancing. With the mechanisms for dis-
tributed data structures and advanced communication optionswhich all
consider the security of the users various applications can be built. The
monitoring solution SkyEye supports the network by gathering and pro-
viding continuously information on the network’s performance that can
be used to fine tune the nodes’ configuration in the system.
6 THE PLUGINSANDAPPLICATIONS
Plugins are software components that add a specific feature to a sys-
tem to enhance the system’s capabilities. The use of plugins in system
design provides for increased extensibility, simplicity in system design
and parallel development of a software application. The plugins used in
LibreSocial are based on the OSGi framework and are placed on top of
the P2P framework layer and rely on the services that it provides. Each
plugin also provides an OSGi command interface that allows the Test
plugin to check functionality of the plugin during distributed tests. The
following are the plugins that were implemented.
• Login: This is the entry point into the network. The plugin handles
the user’s registration and login in the underlying framework.
• Profile: This plugin is used to create a data item that contains the
user’s personal data. The item is stored in the secure P2P stor-
age. It allows for granular adjustment of the private data that
users can view. They can also set cover and profile pictures.
• Notifications: Informs the user about new events within the net-
work such as a friendship request or an invitation to chat. These
events are stored in a distributed list as encrypted notification
objects so that they can be retrieved later by a user who was
offline when the event occurred. Other users can insert these
encrypted messages in the inbox of the designated offline user,
viewing ormodifying existing ones is not possible.
• Files: Allowsuploading, downloading, deleting and sharingoffiles
with other users. When a user selects a file to upload, this file
is fragmented into chunks and stored (and replicated) as dis-
tributed data structure through the P2P framework. After the
upload of all chunks, an additional storage item that contains all
the IDs of the file chunks is generated and stored. Links to this
file can be sent and used in LibreSocial.
• Search: Gives the user the ability to search for users registered
in the network based on searchable (opt-in) information in their
profile such as name, city, country and gender.
• Friends: Manages the relationships that exist between the users
and maintains the userIDs of friends in a DDS Set. It supports
sending of friendship requests to other users, adding, declining
requests as well as blocking and unblocking specific users from
sending friendship requests. Also, it manages the login statuses
set by the users. Friend lists can be turned public or private.
• Messaging: This is comparable to an email application. It allows
users to send messages to and receive messages from other
users, even when offline through the use of the storage-based,
public key encrypted inbox. To save bandwidth and storage
space, the files are not sent along with the message but are
uploaded to the users’ individual file storage and a link is
attached to the message. Users are then able to send attach-
ments using the file links from the Files Plugin.
• Wall: This provides a 1-to-N communication. Each user views a
personalwall pages that they canpost entries to.Other users can
also post to another user’s personal page and also comment on
those posts if they have been accepted as friends. Thewall is one
of the most complex plugin in terms of access control as various
authors interact on a shared space.
• Photos: Allows users to share photos and photo albums with
other users and allows comments on the photos. Owners of
photos/albums can choose whom theywant to share with.
• Groups/Forum: This great plugin models a computer supported
cooperative work environment. When a group is created, the
group of users are provided with a shared storage space to
store files using the Files Plugin as well as a forum for posting
discussions as well. Due to the potentially huge storage space,
complete working and interaction processes can be mapped in
this. Group admins can invite other users to the group. Through
the concept of “groups” in the P2P framework, i.e. set of users,
real-life working hierarchies can be mapped to corresponding
working spaces (Group Plugin).
• Calendar: The plugin allows users to store appointments and
events chronologically. It utilizes a distributed data list to store
the agenda of each user. Using the plugin the user can create,
delete andmodify events. A collaborative sharing is envisioned.
• Voting: Gives users the ability to conduct surveys among a prede-
fined group of users or the entire set of users of the network. The
vote initiator defines a question and a set of response choices,
then invites other users to take part in the survey. Users can
access other existing public votings, remove votes from their
own vote list, invite others to vote and see the results from the
votings after submitting their vote.
• Multichat: Users can chat livewith eachother or in groups via this
plugin through direct communication channels. The plugin lists
the entire communication between a user and the conversation
partner(s). It supports conversations betweenmultiple users.
• Audio/Video chat: It provides an 1-to-1 audio and video commu-
nication through the usage of the WebRTC (https://webrtc.org)
open standard. This is the only plugin that does not use the fea-
tures of the P2P framework for communication but establishes
individual browser-to-browser connections.
• Monitoring: This plugin performs statistical, aggregated moni-
toring of the entire system, on the application, the plugins, the
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framework and the overlay. Currently roughly 600 metrics are
obtained and available to the users. The monitoring plugin is
based on themonitoring solution SkyEye.KOM 60,61.
• Debug/Error Console: This plugin is dedicated to displaying the
information that is generated by the framework while the user
is logged in, including information such as errors, warnings and
debugmessages.
• Test: This plugin is used to test and debug the performance and
reliability of the entire application in a controlled environment.
For simple control of the testing, a centralized master-slave
approach is used. The master sends the test plan to the slaves
which execute it. The test plan is a structured text document that
contains a list of plugin commands in the given order and tim-
ing. The results are obtained through the monitoring plugin and
used to identify whether the preconditions for testing are met
and other parameters are set correctly.
The plugins are divided into two categories, that is mandatory and
optional plugins. The plugins discussed above are all loaded into the
system as mandatory plugins. Further Apps loaded to the system can
assume that these are present. Currently, App from the AppStore are
considered as optional. Their dependencies must be resolved when
installed, similarly as in the GNU packet environment.
7 THEGRAPHICALUSER INTERFACE
The topmost layer of the architecture (Fig. 1) is the graphical user inter-
face (GUI), which is the point of contactwith the users. LibreSocial’s GUI
has undergone many changes since the initial implementation. Starting
from a pure command line interface, to an Eclipse-based applet frame-
work, to its current design which uses standard web technologies such
asHTML5, AJAX, JQuery, Bootstrap andKnockback.js. The current GUI
is shown as a screenshot in Fig. 10. This combination of web technolo-
gies also allows the provision of multi-language support (currently only
English and German) as well as support for mobile devices (at least the
GUI is accessible). The GUI’s backend is composed of three essential
parts, the plugin template, the plugin logic and theWebProvider. These are
discussed in detail.
The plugin template are typical HTML files which use Knockout.js
(knockoutjs.com), a standalone JavaScript implementation based on the
Model-View-View-Model (MVVM) paradigm. Knockout.js is small and
very light weight and presents several advantages in particular, declar-
ative binding of elements tomodels, dependency tracking to reflect val-
ues when the dependency changes, as well as automatic user interface
refresh when the datamodel’s state changes.
The plugin logic deals with the entire process of transferring user
events from the frontend to the REST Handler via the WebProvider
and back to the frontend again. The plugin logic renders data it
receives to the desired template. The proper functioning of this
mechanism requires the creation of models, collections and views,
which is contrary to the MVVM paradigm that provides only models
and views. To support the creation of Models and collections, Back-
bone.js (backbonejs.org) is used, and to support views, Knockback.js
(kmalakoff.github.io/knockback) is used. The use of Backbone.js gives
structure to web applications as it provides the models with key-value
binding and custom events. The data in represented as models with
Backbone.js, which makes it flexible to create, validate and destroy the
models based on the system designer’s needs. In case a change is made
to an attribute of the model through the user interface, a change event
is fired back which can be used by the view to remodify itself based on
themodel modification.
TheWebProvider is a plugin that functions as the interface between
plugins and the GUI and uses the embeddable web server jetty
(www.eclipse.org/jetty) to communicate with the user’s browser, which
acts as the frontend. Despite the fact that this jettymodule uses a single
network port, it can handle three separate tasks distinguishable by the
requestURLs. Fig.9 is the structureof theWebProvider. The three tasks,
provision of the static files, the REST interface and the WebSockets,
constitute the backend.
The browser is the frontend, and does not simply present the infor-
mation emanating from a server, but rather runs as a JavaScript web
application, while managing data exchange with the actual P2P applica-
tion. The views are constructed by bringing together data from the fea-
ture plugins and the corresponding templates. With a few exceptions,
such as the login screen, the browser page is never reloaded entirely but
only relevant parts are updated or exchanged between other modules.
This presents some advantages for social network applications such as
LibreSocial, where communication is desired to be in real time. This
means that several interaction objects can be opened simultaneously
and updated individually.
Although it is technically not possible to install the LibreSocial appli-
cation on mobile devices because of bandwidth and availability limi-
tations, it is nevertheless possible to use the GUI on mobile devices.
Therefore, to support future use of LibreSocial while on the go, a user
interface that works for mobile devices is implemented. Bootstrap (get-
bootstrap.com) is used to provides GUI elements as building blocks that
are automatically organized so as to optimize the screen size and it also
ensures the interaction controls, such as buttons or input fields, are
large enough for touch screen operation. To ensure that the connec-
tion between the backend and the frontend of the application is secure,
even if both parts are domiciled in the same computer, the connection
is transport encrypted using normal Transport Layer Security/Secure
Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) based HTTPS as opposed to using plain HTTP.
8 LIFESOCIAL.KOMVS. LIBRESOCIAL
In this section, we give an analytical comparison of the features of
LifeSocial.KOM and LibreSocial, and show where there are significant
changes in the components or the functionalities. In Table 1, the differ-
ences are tabulated.We give a summary of the differences below.
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FIGURE 9WebProvider FIGURE 10 Screenshots of LibreSocial
• Identity management: Due to the change from using a 1024-bit
RSAalgorithmtoa160-bit ECCalgorithmas thePKI, thenode ID
space is changed from a 1024-bit ID space to a 160-bit ID space.
This allows the generated public key to be directly used in the
network for encrypted communication.
• Message routing strategy: In addition to the traditional forward-
ing strategy to the node with nodeID that is numerically closest
to the required nodeID, LibreSocial also implements a parallel/it-
erative routing strategy. This mitigates against certain attacks
such as Sybil, Eclipse and routing attacks, while also limiting the
lookup time and the amount of traffic generated.
• Capacity awareness: By supporting heterogeneous nodes in
LibreSocial, it is possible to further introduce strategies that
allow the system to gather more informative data such as avail-
able persistent storage space, memory, bandwidth, and type of
devices at login and even at runtime so as to dynamically adjust
the routing table to support strong andweak nodes.
• Group access control: A group access controlmechanism has been
introduced to support sets and nested sets of users allowing
to ease the management of various friend groups and to sup-
port the mapping of organizational hierarchies to e.g. the CSCW
groups and forums.
• Distributed data structures: In addition to the use of the dis-
tributed set/linked list available in LifeSocial.KOM, LibreSocial
also includes Prefix Hash Trees which allows range queries. This
is used when searching for other users based on a given range of
values such as name, location and so on. This feature could also
be used in other future plugins.
• Live conferencing: LifeSocial did not include support for
audio/video live conferencing. This has been included in
LibreSocial usingWebRTC supporting all modern browsers.
• Additional plugins: LibreSocial includes plugins that extend func-
tionality of the OSN not present in LifeSocial.KOM namely
Audio/Video Chat,Wall, Forums, Voting and an Error Console.
• Graphical User interface: As opposed to the Eclipsewindow-based
interface design in LifeSocial.KOM, LibreSocial implements a
web-based user interface that is easier and has more appeal to
the general user.
9 EVALUATIONOF PERFORMANCEANDCOST
In order to measure the efficacy of the system, we carry out an exper-
iment in which all the plugins are run so as to ensure that all system
functions are activated. The quality of the system is given through the
function set and provided features. Three aspects were considered of
importance to show the general costs of the system. These are:
(a) Network cost: This focuses on the data rate (bytes/sec), themes-
sage rate (messages/sec) and the average hop count for lookups.
(b) Storage cost: The focus is on the retrieval time, storage time,
average data stored versus actual data stored at a single node,
and average number of replicas per node versus the actual num-
ber of replicas in a node, displaying the storage load.
(c) Cost of security: This looks at the impact on the data objects
when either symmetric or asymmetric encryption is performed.
Theexperimental setup involves 64LibreSocial instances interacting.
Eight actual computers running Debian Linux run eight slave instances
each with one of the computers also running an additional master
instance that directed the tests and recorded themonitoring results but
does not participate in the network, giving a maximum total of 64 slave
nodes and a single master node. Four sets of experiments were done,
with the same workload and exponentially increasing number of 8, 16,
32 and 64 nodes. In the first 10 minutes, the master node is initialized
and then the slave nodes join in a sequential order to ensure network
stability. Thereafter, the test is conducted as shown in Table 4, with a
gap of one minute between each test. The specific plugin actions are
reflected in the Figures 11a - 11d at the example of the count of inbox
retrievals, friendship requests, groupview requests andalbums created.
Analogue to the workload plan, the objects are created / requested at
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TABLE 1Comparison between LifeSocial.KOM and LibreSocial
Architectural
Level
Functionality Feature LifeSocial.KOM LibreSocial
Overlay Identity Identity Space 1024-bit nodeID 160-bit nodeID
Messaging Routing performance O(logN) O(logN)
Routing strategy Query forwarding Query forwarding. Supports parallel
and iterative routing
Capacity
awareness
Mobile vs static nodes Not supported Statically supported
Security Asym. encryption RSAwith 1024-bit keys ECCwith 160-bit keys
Symmetric encryption AESwith 128-bit key AESwith 128-bit key
Framework Storage File management PAST Heavily extended PAST
and File access control Supported Supported
replication Group access control Not supported Supported
Distributed data
structures
Distributed set, distributed
linked list
Distributed set, distributed linked list,
prefix hash trees
Communi- Publish-subscribe Scribe Scribe
cation Multicast streaming SplitStream SplitStream
Live conferencing Not supported Implemented usingWebRTC
Optional Monitoring Tree-basedmonitoring (SkyEye) Tree-basedmonitoring (SkyEye)
Plugin and
application
Plugins Application plugins Login, Profile, Notification, Files,
Search, Friends, Groups, Calen-
dar, Messaging, Multichat, Pho-
tos, Testing, Monitoring.
Login, Profile, Notification, Files,
Search, Friends, Groups, Calen-
dar, Messaging, Multichat, Photos,
Testing, Monitoring, Error Console,
Audio/Video chat,Wall, Forums, Voting
User interface Window-based Web-based
TABLE 2 Evaluation of ECC
- the asymmetric algorithm as PKI
Data Size (bytes) Time taken (ms)
Original Encrypted Overhead Signature Encrypt Decrypt Sign Verify
1455 1497 42 48 7.75 2.93 2.79 3.81
1461 1513 52 47 6.35 3.24 1.90 3.39
1493 1545 52 47 3.33 3.73 2.81 8.07
1807 1849 42 47 11.52 4.93 4.58 7.68
2013 2057 44 47 9.54 12.94 2.72 4.90
2133 2185 52 48 3.22 2.82 1.61 3.19
TABLE 3 Evaluation of AES
- the symmetric encryption algorithm
Data size (bytes) Time (ms)
Original Encrypted Overhead Encrypt Decrypt
609 624 15 0.13 0.44
784 800 16 0.12 0.12
805 816 11 0.09 0.09
827 832 5 0.20 0.29
845 848 3 0.11 0.14
880 896 16 0.11 0.21
TABLE 4Baseline test workload
Plugin Action Repetitions(Count)
Duration
(mins)
Messaging Sendmessage 8 2
View inboxmessages 4 2
View outboxmessages 4 2
Livechat Sendmultichat invitation 2 1
Sendmultichat message 8 2
Leavemultichat message 2 1
Group Create group 4 2
Invite friend to group 4 2
View group 8 2
Leave group 2 2
Filestorage Create folder 4 2
Upload file in folder 32 6
View folder 4 2
Delete file from folder 8 2
Delete folder 2 2
Forum Create forum thread 4 2
Comment forum thread 4 2
View forum thread 4 2
View forum 4 2
Photos Create photo album 4 2
Upload photo 32 6
View own album 4 2
View friend’s album 4 2
View friend’s photo 32 6
Delete photo 16 2
Delete album 4 2
Voting Create vote 4 2
Add public vote 4 2
Voting invite user 4 2
Vote 16 4
Getmy votings 4 2
Get voting results 16 2
Wall Sendwall post 4 2
Comment wall post 4 2
View ownwall 4 2
View friend’s wall 4 2
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(a)Message plugin: view inbox count
 0
 1000
 2000
 3000
 4000
 5000
 6000
 7000
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160
El
em
en
ts
Time Stamp (Minutes)
64 nodes
32 nodes
16 nodes
8 nodes
(b) Friends plugin: friendship requests
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(c)Group plugin: group view requests
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(d) Photo plugin: albums created
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(e) Total data receive rate
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(f)Max. data receive rate per node
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(g)Max. DDS retrieve rate per node
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(h) Total message receive rate
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(i)Averagemessage hop count
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(k)Average storage time
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FIGURE 11Analysis of LibreSocial’s Performance and Cost
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the corresponding time of the plan. All actionswere successful. The net-
work and storage analysis is shown in Figures 11e - 11p and for security
analysis in Tables 2 and 3. A discussion of this analysis follows.
9.1 Network
In the setup with 64 nodes, we observe that the total data transfer of
reaches an approximate maximum of 250MB/s in the network (see Fig.
11e) with an maximum peak load per node at 3.9 MB/s within the first
ten minutes (see Fig. 11f), which corresponds to the network initializa-
tion phase. However, in general, network data rates oscillate between
0 and 150 MB/s with peaks during the network initialization phase,
the file uploads and the photo uploads (see Fig. 11d). This corresponds
to 2.4 MB/s as average peak load per node across all setups, which is
acceptable. The number of nodes does not effect the max node load, as
newnodes bring statisticallymore resources than they consume. Please
note, that we present the in traffic characteristics, as the out traffic /
sending transmission rates are lower than the receiving rates. This is due
to the same homogeneous transmission load at all nodes in the work
plan, i.e. homogeneous send rates, heterogeneous receive rates. The
maximum load for sendingmessages is roughlyhalf of the receiving load.
The transmission of DDS, i.e. distributed data structures, is taking
the biggest impact on the traffic, as shown in Fig. 11g. Further traffic
sources are the replication of the stored data items as well as messages.
Messages in a network may be join messages, leave messages, mainte-
nance messages, user messages or request and retrieval of results 64.
The network message rate (see Fig. 11h peaks at the end of the exper-
iment with up to 13,000 messages/s, corresponding to the Wall plugin
experiment. This is due to the retrieval of the DDS associated with the
wall comments. In general, the total message rate oscillates between 0
and6000messages/sec. Fig. 11h shows themaximumper nodemessage
rate, reaching 100message/s. Both numbers are considered low.
We have a very low hop count of 0 to 1 in the system (see Fig. 11i).
This is due to the fact that the routing table has room for 160 ·20 = 3200
entries, sufficient to list the maximum 64 nodes in the setup. Mostly,
every node has information about every other node in our setup. As the
overlay provides lookups in logarithmic time to the number of nodes
in the system, only a setup with hundred thousands of nodes would
increase the hop count significantly. Correspondingly to the low hop
count, the retrieval times (see Fig. 11j) and storage times (see Fig. 11k)
are also very low at 50 and 110 milliseconds. The storage needs twice
the retrieval time mainly due to the creation of replicas during storage.
Both values are considered tolerable.
9.2 Storage
Figure 11m to Figure 11p show the storage analysis of our tests. The
focus of the storage analysis is the storage and replication load in total
and at the most loaded node. The overall number of unique objects is
shown in Fig. 11m, the number of corresponding replicas is presented
in Fig. 11o. As same test operations were performed at every node
instance, the storage initiation load was the same for all nodes, while
the actual storage node was diverse. As pointed out earlier, LibreSocial
is designed to ensure that no single node is overwhelmed with storage
requests, and that the replication requests are evenly distributed in the
entire network. The peak load load is roughly small with 4100 unique
itemsat themost loadednode (seeFig. 11n) and14,000 replicated items
at maximum per node (see Fig. 11p). These maximum values are less
than twice the average storage load of 2500 unique items in average per
node and approx. 8000 replicated items in average per node. Thus the
maximum loaddeviation is below2, showing a fair loaddistribution. This
shows that the additional load brought by further nodes to the system
enlarges the resource pool that is used uniformly.
9.3 Security
One of the changes between LifeSocial and LibreSocial is the public key
infrastructure used. LifeSocial implemented 1024-bit RSA algorithm 50
while in LibreSocial this was changed to a 160-bit ECC algorithm 51,52.
The performance of the ECC algorithm is shown in Table 2 which can be
comparedwith the results in 22. In general, the overhead ismuch smaller
than forRSAalgorithm, andequally theencryptionanddecryption times
are significantly reduced. Also, we evaluated theAES algorithm for sym-
metric encryption and tabulated the results in Table 3. The overheads
are generally small asmost of theobjects areusually less than1kilobyte,
with the encryption and decryption times being less than 1millisecond.
10 CONCLUSION
This paper presents LibreSocial in full, anP2P-basedplatform forOnline
Social Networks. The goal of the development of this OSN applica-
tion is to provide a fully-distributed, secure online social network that
offers with high-quality services while having practically no operational
cost, despite running on unreliable, unsecure and sometimes malicious
user devices. To match the needs for such an OSN, the paper specifies
technical requirements for a P2P-based OSN, and shows how Libre-
Social is designed to meet these requirements. LibreSocial is designed
on a structured P2P overlay, FreePastry, with modifications for identity
management and security, hence guaranteeing logarithmic routing effi-
ciency.While PASToffers simplefile storage, the inclusion of distributed
sets, distributed linked-lists and prefix hash trees provides support for
complex data such as albums, comments and inbox messages, while
ensuring these have access control features, and opens up the system
to the implementation of more advanced searching mechanisms such
as range searches. Themonitoring and testing plugins included in Libre-
Social sets it above other systems as it allows for quality of service
(QoS) monitoring using the available aggregated metrics and therefore
adjustments can be made to achieve desired QoS standards. Through
the broad capabilities of the used P2P framework, LibreSocial provides
simple yet powerful implementations of OSN functions, such as friends,
messaging, photos, walls but also unique features such as group/forums,
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file hosting, voting and audio/video chat. The modern user interface
makes it compelling to use.
Selected elements of LibreSocial have been partially published
before and reached very positive reaction in the community, corre-
sponding dissertations 21,55,56,57 around LibreSocial elaborate on spe-
cific elements, such as the overlay, the storage and the monitoring. This
is thefirst in detail overviewon the overall architecture and interdepen-
dencies of the elements. In general, LibreSocial offers aworking solution
for fully distributed, securebut also highquality social networking and is
capable to further support a wide set of simple to develop applications.
As next step, we aim to deploy LibreSocial in a beta test to gain fur-
ther insights on its performance ’in the wild’. With this, we work on our
vision to provide a feature-rich tool for secure and privacy-aware com-
munication and interaction, that cannot be surveilled or shut down 65,
thus providing a tool for free speech in today’s challenging times.
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